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NOTES
KENTUCKY'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE BROAD
FORM DEED
I. INTRODUCTION
Kentucky is now the number one coal producing state in
America with total production in 1973 of more than 127,000,000
tons.' Some of the coal fields in this state have been in opera-
tion for more than a century. Almost every kind of mine has
existed at one time or another in Kentucky. Unlike most of the
other leading mining states, this state has two separate and
distinct coal fields, one at each end of the state. Although these
regions are extensive and are heavily mined, they are very dif-
ferent geologically. In addition to its vast coal deposits, Ken-
tucky has a number of other minerals in amounts sufficient to
induce their extraction. For example, oil, gas, clays, limestone,
and iron ore are recovered throughout most of the state,2 and
the hills and plains of this state doubtless contain as yet un-
tapped treasures.
3
With such extensive mining, quarrying and drilling activ-
ity over a long period of time, it is not surprising that an exten-
sive lore of mineral development law has been fashioned in
Kentucky. The Court of Appeals has been faced with a rich
variety of cases involving the mineral industries in their con-
flicts with each other, with the public, and with individual
landowners affected by their operations. The Court's solutions
to some of these problems have been unique in the United
States.
1 1973 Ky. DEPr. OF MINES AND MiNERAis ANNUAL REPORT, at 8. This figure repre-
sents an increase of more than 7,000,000 tons from the 120,271,247 tons reported in
1972. In 1973 64,145,581 tons were produced by surface methods, whereas 63,361,739
tons were produced by underground techniques. Id. In 1973 Kentucky regained the lead
among coal producing states by surpassing West Virginia in total production by ap-
proximately ten million tons.
2 1961 Ky. DEPT. OF Eco. D.v., Mn Es AND MINEm.S Div., REP. ON RESOURCES OF
Ky. at 8 [hereinafter cited as REsoURCES OF KY.].
In 1953 Kentucky coal reserves were carefully studied and catalogued by the
Department of Mines and Minerals. Of an estimated 123,327,000,000 short tons origi-
nally present, 118,973,000,000 tons were still in the ground; this is more than either of
the other two leading bituminous coal producing states-West Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania. REsOURCES OF Ky. at 4.
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Mining and drilling are by their nature damaging to the
land from which minerals are taken; therefore, since that por-
tion of society not engaged in the business of extracting miner-
als must also receive-its support, directly or indirectly, from the
land, conflicts with the mineral industries have been frequent
and bitter. From this basic premise, it naturally follows that
the law of mining has been a constant balancing of the need
for a free and reasonably unrestricted mineral industry against
the need for the same land to be used for other purposes.
As though to symbolize the conflict inherent in mining, the
law long ago recognized mineral rights-the right to mine and
drill-as a separate estate in land. Mineral estates are said to
be "severed" from the surface estate.4 Severance may be ac-
complished either by a lease of the mineral rights while the
lessor retains the surface for his own use or by a deed which
creates a full mineral estate in every way distinct from the
surface estate.5 A mineral deed operates to create a fee simple
in the minerals while the fee simple in the surface continues as
before, subject to easements or hereditaments in the mineral
owner to use the surface for purposes of mining.'
Despite their legal severability these two estates are in fact
intermingled and mixed; indeed, the mineral is covered by the
earth of the other estate. As a result surface rights are inherent
in mineral ownership. 7 For example, coal is worthless unless its
owner has access to it. Thus the law considers access as an
inherent right appurtenant to mineral estates. Moreover, since
access to coal can be achieved only through the surface estate,
the surface is burdened not only by an easement for access but
also by an easement to remove overlying rock strata ("overbur-
den") in order to extract the minerals. This is in essence a right
to remove the overlying surface itself. Because the surface
owner has no corresponding easement in the mineral estate, the
Duncan v. Mason, 39 S.W.2d 1006 (Ky. 1931).
1 W. THORNTON, OIL AND GAS § 131 (5th ed. 1932) [hereinafter cited as
THORNrON].
I Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
7 Simon v. Langholf, 293 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1956); P & N Inv. Co. v. Florida Ran-
chettes, Inc., 220 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969); Pickens v. Adams, 131 N.E.2d 38
(Ill. 1956); Brooks v. Mull, 78 P.2d 879 (Kan. 1938); McNeese v. Renner, 21 So. 2d 7
(Miss. 1945); Hurley v. Northern Pacific Ry., 455 P.2d 321 (Mont. 1969); Melton v.
Sneed, 109 P.2d 509 (Okla. 1940).
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mineral is considered the dominant estate while the surface is'
the servient estate."
The law is well settled, however, that the owner of the
minerals has the right to use the surface only to the extent that
is reasonably necessary or incident to his development, use,
and enjoyment of his own property.' He must act with due care
to protect the surface owner's rights."0 It is at best a matter of
give and take among competing interests. Through an exami-
nation of the Kentucky law relative to the rights of surface and
mineral owners, one can determine to what extent and in what
ways the land is servient to the rights of owners of minerals.
A cursory reading of Kentucky cases reveals an extreme
protectioi of mineral rights with relatively little concern for the
surface owner, particularly where coal is concerned. Often, the
relative rights of the parties are determined by the Court's
construction of the wording of old mineral conveyances called
"broad form deeds," which must be examined carefully in
every case. The case law of the past twenty years perhaps best
illustrates both the bias in Kentucky law in favor of mineral
rights and the manner in which the judiciary of this state has
helped to perpetuate that bias by its interpretation of the broad
form deed.
I. THE NATURE OF MINERAL ESTATES
A. Ownership Theory
There are two theories in the United States concerning
severed interests in real property, chiefly mineral rights. The
ownership theory provides that the mineral is an estate sepa-
rate from and of equal dignity with the surface.' The mineral
interest, the actual ownership of the minerals below surface, is
in the nature of real property.' 2 The owner of the severed inter-
est is not a tenant in common with the surface owner in any
Sammons v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 201 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Ky. 1947); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
4 W. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 652 (1962).
' THoRNroN § 131.
" Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1956); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co.,
22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891); 1 E. KuNrz, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as KuNrrz].
,2 THORNTON § 131. See also Farnsworth v. Barrett, 142 S.W. 1049 (Ky. 1912).
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sense.' 3 The surface is dominant only to the extent that it is
entitled to subadjacent support, protection from polluted water
during mining, and certain other easements.'4
Since the estates are of equal dignity, usually both fees
simple, there is no merger when both estates come into the
hands of the same owner.'" If the surface owner, after reacquisi-
tion of the mineral which had been previously severed, conveys
his land without an explicit reference to the minerals, has he
conveyed the minerals? The cases on this point are few and
badly split. 6 Some have applied the presumption that a gran-
tor intends to convey all his interest in the land unless the
contrary appears.'7 Conversely, other cases have refused to
apply this presumption to the case of a severed estate because
it is a completely distinct and equal interest not described in
a general warranty deed for land in fee simple.'" Certainly a
cautious conveyancer would draft the instrument with care to
avoid any question.
B. Profit Theory
According to the other theory after the mineral rights have
been conveyed, the surface owner continues to enjoy a fee sim-
ple absolute, including full ownership of the minerals in the
ground. His estate, however, is subject to a profit a prendre, an
incorporeal hereditament, in the other party to take and re-
move the minerals.'9 Title to the minerals passes to the lessee,
the owner of the mineral rights, only when they have been
removed from the earth and reduced to possession." Under this
,3 Virginia Coal and Coke Co. v. Kelly, 24 S.E. 1020 (Va. 1896); Harris v. Cobb,
38 S.E. 559 (W. Va. 1901).
" Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 106 (5th Cir. Ct. 1911), aff'd
106 N.E. 1053 (1913).
KUNTZ § 2.2.
" The following cases held that merger had terminated the separate mineral es-
tate: Humphries v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 393 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1968); Jones v.
McFaddin, 382 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). For a case that found no merger
see Ferguson v. Hilborn, 402 P.2d 914 (Okla. 1965).
11 For a discussion of the rules of construction regarding written instruments, see
generally 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF RYAL PROPRTY 902 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1973).
" KUNTz § 3.2.
" Callahan v. Martin, 43 P.2d 788 (Cal. 1935); Pickens v. Adams, 131 N.E.2d 38,
43 (Ill. 1956).
Wright v. Carter Oil Cos., 223 P. 835 (Okla. 1923).
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theory the minerals are personalty. Since there is only one
estate, subject to a lesser interest, merger would extinguish the
profit a prendre if both interests were acquired by the same
owner.2 1' Moreover, because the mineral lessee has the exclusive
right to remove the mineral, the surface owner holds possession
as trustee for the lessee of the mineral until it is recovered.
22
Under the ownership theory the mineral estate is of potentially
eternal duration as any other fee simple.r Subject to loss by
adverse possession, failure to extract the mineral will not affect
the ownership or right to exploit the mineral. 24 By contrast,
failure to use a profit a prendre may result in its loss after
passage of a reasonable period of time because the right is
limited and little more than a license. 5
C. Kentucky Interpretation
Kentucky favors the ownership theory but both kinds of
interests may exist, depending upon the type of instrument by
which the rights were granted. 26 The language of the convey-
ance must be chosen with some care if a lease of limited dura-
tion is intended. On the other hand, if title to the minerals
themselves is to be vested in the lessee, what may have been
intended only as a lease will be construed as a deed-a sale of
the mineral.Y For example, where a landowner conveyed all the
"mineral right and coal privileges and rights of way, together
with the right to search for all undiscovered minerals, with
warranty," it was determined that title to the minerals was
21 KuNTZ § 3.2, at 80.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.430 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81 (Ky. 1919).
24 Dominion over mineral must be open and notorious. Surface ownership is not
adverse to mineral ownership unless the surface owner actually exercises control over
the mineral estate apart from his control over the surface. Pond Creek Coal Co. v.
Hatfield, 239 F. 622 (6th Cir. 1917). Payment of mineral taxes by the surface owner is
not adverse possession. Id. at 623. One who possesses the surface does not possess
severed minerals, except as trustee for the mineral owner as provided in KRS § 381.430.
Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, 249 F. 840 (6th Cir. 1918); Thornbury v.
Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co., 287 S.W. 698 (Ky. 1925). Finally, the Court of Appeals
held that the surface owner must actually mine the coal to be adverse to the mineral
owner. Hoskins v. Northern Lee Oil & Gas Co., 240 S.W. 377 (Ky. 1922).
2 Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919).
28 Id. at 82.
n Id. at 83.
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vested in the grantee. The Court did not consider it determina-
tive that title to the minerals was not expressly conveyed.2
The instrument in Scott v. Laws2' was somewhat crudely
drafted, but it illustrates the Kentucky interpretation of min-
eral deeds and leases. In 1859, J. H. Laws owned land adjacent
to that of Valentine Gearheart in Floyd County. Gearheart
conveyed by deed the mineral rights to Laws. In 1860 Laws and
his wife conveyed the mineral rights in Gearheart's land, to-
gether with all their own land in fee simple, to the Big Sandy
Coal and Mining Co., retaining a mortgage on the land to se-
cure bonds received as payment. J. H. Laws thereafter died
and the bonds descended to his sole heir, Harry L. Laws, who
eventually foreclosed the mortgage and became the owner of
the land. Meanwhile, in 1905, L. Dow Scott had purchased the
surface held by Gearheart's heirs and instituted a quiet title
suit regarding the minerals. The Big Sandy Coal and Mining
Co. had possessed title to the mineral rights for more than forty
years without undertaking operations of any kind. Scott,
stressing language in the deed which stated that Valentine
Gearheart sold "the above described privileges," argued that it
conveyed only a license which had terminated by non-use.
Moreover, Valentine's wife had released her dower only in "the
above described privileges. 30 Certainly if the intent had been
to convey the minerals themselves, it was strange ihat the deed
was in terms of privileges, a word more often associated with
easements and licenses than with ownership.3' The Court of
Appeals conceded that a mineral license may be lost through
nonuse but held that the deed was sufficient to create a full
mineral estate.3 2 In so holding it emphasized a part of the deed
by which the grantor conveyed "the mineral rights and coal
privileges and rights of way to and from said minerals and coal
privileges. . . unto the said James H. Laws forever, free from
me, my heirs and assigns, and will forever warrant and defend
the same." This language was found to be sufficient to show the
intention of the grantor to convey the exclusive and perpetual
2 Id. at 82.
Id. at 81.
3Id.
3, 3 POWELL 405, at 395
" Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919).
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right to all the minerals, in other words, to convey title to
them.33
Kentucky had adopted the "broad construction" for min-
eral deeds and leases in 1910.11 Under this theory a grant or
exception of all minerals includes all inorganic substances
which may be profitably taken from the land. To restrict the
meaning of the phrase "all minerals," there must be qualifying
language evidencing an intent to convey something less than
all substances legally cognizable as minerals. 5 Notwithstand-
ing this broad rule of construction, the decision in Scott v.
Laws seems extreme. It is submitted that the qualifying lan-
guage was present since only privileges and rights are men-
tioned-not title to the minerals. Similarly, the conclusion that
because the grant of minerals was unlimited the title was
passed is a non sequitur. A lease of all mineral substances could
have been intended. The Court apparently assumed that title
passed but nowhere did it explain the basis for that assump-
tion. Perhaps since loss through non-use was at issue, the per-
petual warranty was given particular significance; one can only
wonder. Due to these inadequacies, Scott v. Laws may have
little value as precedent.
It is possible to avoid the effect of a broad construction of
"all minerals" by establishing that the parties intended only
to convey those minerals enumerated in the deed. For example,
a mineral deed granting "all minerals such as coal, iron, silver,
gold, copper, lead, bismuth, antimony, zinc, or any other min-
eral of any marketable value" has been held not to convey oil
and gas.3" Recognizing that "all minerals" would ordinarily
include oil and gas, the Court, nevertheless, held that since the
deed had to be interpreted as a whole, the listing of several
solid mineral substances indicated that the parties were not
contemplating liquid resources.
37
" Id. at 82. In drafting mineral deeds it should be kept in mind that a conveyance
of less than a right to remove all the minerals is more likely to be considered a lease,
other factors being equal, than one including the right to remove it all. Williamson v.
Williamson, 45 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1928).
31 Kentucky Diamond Mining and Dev. Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co.,
132 S.W. 397 (Ky. 1910).
215 S.W. at 82, citing Kentucky Diamond Mining and Dev. Co. v. Kentucky
Transvaal Diamond Co., 132 S.W. 397, 398 (Ky: 1910).
3 McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314 (Ky.
1909).
31 Id. at 316.
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In cases involving interpretation of deeds such as those
just discussed, it is generally recognized that reservations or
exceptions in an instrument are construed in favor of the gran-
tee where there is an ambiguity.38 This rule is based on the
notion that the grantor, the presumed drafter, has the oppor-
tunity to provide unequivocal language to avoid any uncertain-
ties. 9
In Kentucky, as elsewhere, however, not only have deeds
involving minerals frequently been drafted by attorneys for the
grantee but also in many cases only the grantee, has known
what lay beneath the surface. This gulf of experience and ex-
pertise between the parties (the grantee, usually an oil, gas, or
coal company as opposed to the often unsophisticated ordinary
landowner-grantor) has almost always worked to the disadvan-
tage of the grantor. For these reasons it has been suggested that
mineral deeds should be treated as contracts of adhesion
strictly construed against the drafter-often the grantee." The
treatment of insurance policies is analogous. In that instance
a large corporation with a sophisticated legal staff bargains
with individuals usually unfamiliar with the intricate service
the corporation offers. Well established case law interprets in-
surance policies in favor of the insured, and at least one court,
without any reference to insurance contracts, has followed the
same reasoning for oil and gas leases.4'
Much of Kentucky's mineral wealth was sold years ago
under sweeping broad form deeds drafted by coal and land
companies. By their express terms these instruments made the
surface estates almost totally servient to the mineral estates.
In recent years a great deal of litigation has arisen regarding
broad form deeds, and the resulting decisions have extended
11 Hosbach v. Head, 284 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1955); Eastham v. Church, 219 S.W.2d
406 (Ky. 1949); Hunt v. Hunt, 82 S.W. 998 (Ky. 1904).
11 See, e.g., Hosbach v. Head, 284 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1955). Conditions and restric-
tions are strictly construed. Cf. Chambers v. Thomas, 205 S.W.2d 1000 (Ky. 1947). One
reason advanced for strict construction of land use restrictions is that fee simple owner-
ship has always been favored at law. Trustees of Presbytery, U.S.A., Inc. v. Garrard
Co. Bd. Educ., 348 S.W.2d 846 (Ky. 1961).
40 Cf. Thompson, Surface Damages-Claims by Surface Estate Owners Against
Mineral Estate Owner, 14 Wyo. L.J. 99 (1960).
' Weaver v. National Fidelity Ins. Co., 377 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. 1963). One court
has reached the same result with oil and gas leases. Wyckoff v. Brown, 11 P.2d 720
(Kan. 1932).
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the rights of mineral holders even further than the already
drastic language of the deeds. The broad form deed might just
as well have been called the long form; Kentucky courthouses
contain many yellowing samples with granting clauses more
than five typewritten pages in length. Virtually everything is
included. An abbreviated example of the all encompassing
broad form deed appears in Case v. Elkhorn Coal Corp.2 :
Conveying all the minerals, etc., . . . and such of the
standing timber thereon as may, at the time of the use
thereof, be or by the party of the second part [grantee], its
successors or assigns, be deemed necessary or convenient for
mining purposes, or so deemed necessary or convenient for
the ex6rcise and enjoyment of any or all of the property rights
and privileges herein bargained, sold, granted or conveyed
• . . and the exclusive rights of way for any and all. . . haul
roads and other ways, pipe lines, telegraph and telephone
lines that may hereafter be located on said land by the parties
of the first part, their heirs, representatives, or assigns, or by
the party of the second part, its successors or assigns, or by
any person or corporation with or without the authority of
either of said parties, their, or its heirs, representatives, suc-
cessors, or assigns; . . . and to use and operate the surface
thereof and any and all parts thereof. . . and also the right
to build, erect, alter, repair, maintain, and operate upon said
land . . . any and all houses, shops, buildings . . . and
machinery and mining and any and all equipment, that may
by the party of the second part, its successors or assigns, be
deemed necessary or convenient for the full and free exercise
and enjoyment of any and all the property rights and privi-
leges hereby bargained, granted, sold, or conveyed; . . . and
the right to remove all pillars and other lateral and subjacent
supports (from the mines) without leaving pillars to support
the roof or surface;. . . and the right to erect upon said land,
and maintain, use, repair, and operate, and at their pleasure
remove therefrom any and all buildings and machinery and
mining and any and all equipment, whether specifically enu-
merated herein or not, that may by the party of the second
part, its successors or assigns, be deemed necessary or con-
42 276 S.W. 573, 574 (Ky. 1925). For another example of the sweeping nature of
the broad form deed, see Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 489 F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (6th Cir.
1974).
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venient for the exercise or enjoyment of any or all of the
property, rights, and privileges herein . . ' granted or con-
veyed, and also free access to, upon, and over said land for
the puprose of surveying and prospecting for said property
and interests. . . . And it, said party of the second part, its
successors, and assigns, to have unlimited time in which to
do so, and shall not be limited to commence the exercise or
enjoyment of all or any of said property, rights, and privileges
at any particular or reasonable time; and when so comm-
enced shall not be deemed to have abandoned nor forfeited
the same, nor any pa r thereof by a, or any cessation thereof,
or any part thereof. . . . But there is reserved to the parties
of the first part all the timber upon the said land, except that
necessary for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned; and there
is also reserved the free use of said land for agricultural pur-
poses, so far as such use is consistent with the rights hereby
bargained, sold, granted and conveyed; and right to mine and
use coal for their own personal household and domestic pur-
poses.
41
The reservation of the right by the grantor to use his land
for all purposes not inconsistent with the rights granted the
mineral holder has proved an almost worthless protection. For
example, the surface may not be subdivided for residential
development without the consent of the owner of the mineral
estate. If such subdivision is made, it may not impair access
to the minerals; furthermore, the burdens associated with min-
ing do not have to be distributed evenly over the whole tract."
It has been held that where the damming of a stream on the
land to create a lake would interfere with mining, the mineral
holder may recover damages for all interference with his opera-
tions caused by the flooding.4 5
Another type of broad form deed, often called the "Mayo
form," is named after John C.C. Mayo, a well known Eastern
Kentucky land and coal trader at the end of the nineteenth
Id. at 574.
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928).
Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Wood, 292 S.W. 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). In
connection with the dominant mineral owner's right to prevent unusual development
of the surface which would impair his mining rights, some unusual cases have arisen.
It has been held that the surface owner may not impair mining rights by setting aside
most of the surface for a cemetery. Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen, 324 S.W.2d
562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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century." The Mayo form deed grants the right to remove "all
minerals now known or hereafter discovered. . by all means
either now known or hereafter discovered."4 With language
such as this, there presumably would be little room left for
challenging these deeds other than upon grounds of public pol-
icy. But many cases have arisen where the rights of the parties
or their successors were uncertain. It is therefore appropriate
to analyze the Kentucky law regarding such deeds and their
less sweeping "short form" counterparts as they have devel-
oped within the larger context of mineral conveyances.
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE MINERAL OWNER
A. Drilling and Mining Rights
Mineral ownership, as noted above, carries with it the
right to use the surface reasonably for purposes of exploiting
* that mineral. In this regard several common law easements are
recognized. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the right to
sink shafts and drill through the surface to reach the mineral.
This is an implied easement which exists even though the deed
is silent.48 Courts have long recognized that
a grant of minerals implies the right to win them from the
underlying soil. The use of some portion of the surface is
necessary for the proper enjoyment of this right. To reach the
mineral the miner must pass from the surface downward. To
do this he has a way of necessity. He may sink through such
land from the surface to the mines in order to reach them."
Although the preceding implied easement is well estab-
lished, the exact amount of the surface that may be used for
drilling or mining without an additional grant by the surface
owner is uncertain. In an interesting Mississippi case 0 a drill-
ing company, under contract with the mineral owner, cleared
11 See, M. Chapman, Influence of Coal in the Big Sandy Valley, 1945 (thesis in
University of Kentucky Library).
11 Tolliver v. Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1956). The
Court in Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1974),
overruled Tolliver to the extent it held "that the mineral owner cannot be held liable
to the surface owner for creating a nuisance."
, Baker v. Pittsburgh, C. & W.R. Co., 68 A. 1014 (Pa. 1908).
' Id. at 1115.
Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 1962).
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timber and graded part of the plaintiff's land preparatory to
drilling for oil. The well proved unproductive and was finally
plugged as a "dry hole." There was conflicting testimony as to
how much land was cleared for the drilling, but the plaintiff
claimed that three acres more than necessary had been dis-
turbed. The defendant, claiming that only two and a half acres
were cleared, argued that the acreage cleared was not an unrea-
sonable use of land for drilling. The court affirmed a jury find-
ing that the amount of land cleared and graded was unreason-
able but reversed the damages as being excessive. The court
stated that the amount of land that is unreasonable or exces-
sive must be measured not by the minimum possible land use
but by the accepted method of mining or drilling currently in
use in the industry.5" If the amount of land used is not excessive
by industry standards, the lessor cannot complain even if the
land actually used is completely destroyed. As the Supreme
Court of Mississippi put it, "[tihe right to remove minerals
by the usual or customary methods of mining exists, even
though the surface of the ground may be wholly destroyed as a
result thereof.
'52
Implicit in this declaration is the assumption that a min-
eral extractor operating in conformity with prevailing industry
methods and standards is not acting wantonly or wilfully. Ordi-
narily a wilful act will subject the actor to liability even if he
would have been entirely within his rights had he not acted
wilfully.53 In Kentucky a dispute involving this issue is a jury
question, and the court should give an instruction that the use
of land was not wilful or unreasonable if the use conformed to
current industry practices. 4 Moreover, there should be an in-
struction that the mineral lessor is not under a duty to restore
the surface to its former condition after mining.
The liability of mining and drilling interests is not always
at an end merely because the surface owner has no legal basis
to complain. For example, in drilling for oil, large "slushpits"
11 Id. at 555.
52 Id. at 556.
Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, 263 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1953); Elkhorn Coal Corp.
v. Yonts, 262 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1953); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466
(Ky. 1953); General Refractories Co. v. Swetman, 197 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1946).
51 Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 556 (Miss. 1962).
55 Id.
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are often bulldozed near the well to trap escaping oil wastes.
Although after drilling operations are completed the mineral
owner is not under an obligation to fill the slushpit, he may be
liable to anyone other than the surface owner who is harmed
by it. 5 Furthermore, a mineral owner's failure to plug an oil or
gas well or to seal a mine may result in liability for damage
not only to adjoining surface owners but also to other mineral
owners as well. Often the oil and gas rights are held by one
lessee while coal rights are held by another. When this occurs
the owner of the lower lying mineral has a right to penetrate
the above seam of mineral, but in doing so he must minimize
the damage to that property.57 Additionally, by statute the
shaft of abandoned oil and gas wells must be plugged with rock,
cement and other enduring materials if the shaft passes
through minable coal or other mineral deposits." Though fail-
ure to plug an abandoned hole in the manner specified by the
statute is negligence per se, a party alleging damage must
prove that the damage was the proximate result of the violation
of the statute. 9
An additional area where Kentucky courts have permitted
the surface owner to recover for damage to his land occurs when
drilling rights for oil and gas are recognized in the lease but the
drilling is carried out in a manner other than that contem-
plated when the deed was executed. In Wiser Oil Co. v.
Conley0 a lease executed in 1917 gave the lessee all the custom-
ary drilling and exploration rights. In the early 1960's the les-
see's successor began using the "waterflooding" method to re-
cover the oil beneath the plaintiff's land. Waterflooding had
been used experimentally a few times prior to 1917, but it
certainly was not in general use in the oil or gas industries. This
method involves the drilling of an unusually large number of
shafts into the ground and the pumping of enormous quantities
of water into the oil well. Since petroleum is lighter than water,
Central Oil Co. v. Shows, 149 So. 2d 306 (Miss. 1963).
'7 Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Ky. 1960).
"' KRS § 353.120.
" Nisbet v. Van Tuyl, 224 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1955). This case was decided according
to Kentucky law.
-- 380 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1964). See also Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718
(Ky. 1960).
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it rises and is pumped out through other shafts. In the Wiser
Oil Co. case the company drilled eleven water input holes
through seams of coal retained by the surface owner. Applica-
ble mine safety regulations required that columns of coal 200
feet square be left undisturbed around each of the proposed
wells. As a result, the new wells were distributed over most of
the property, making mining of the coal much more difficult
as well as damaging the surface heavily.
The oil company relied on General Refractories Co. v.
Swetman6' which contained broad dictum favoring mineral
estates:
Numerous authorities could be-cited to the effect that, unless
the conveyance itself repels the construction, one who owns
the mineral rights in a tract of land by implication of law
acquires the right to use as much of the surface as may be
reasonably necessary for the beneficial and profitable opera-
tion of his mines.6
2
The company claimed not only the right to use the surface but
also denied liability for the resulting damage to the surface. In
Buchanan v. Watson 3 a strip mining company was held not
liable for surface damages under similar circumstances, but
there the mineral deed, one of the broad form variety, con-
tained an express waiver-of-damages provision lacking in the
Wiser oil and gas lease. 4
The Court in Wiser, adhering to its precedent in General
Refractories, held that the implied easement in the mineral
owner to use the surface allowed waterflooding. It noted, how-
ever, that "principles of justice and humanity would require
that reasonable compensation be paid the landowner for the
devastation wrought. 6 5 Unfortunately, this moderating state-
ment has not been followed by later cases involving the same
issue in the context of far more destructive strip mining for
coal.66
62 197 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1946).
62 Id. at 770.
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
, Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1960).
'Id.
In Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968), the Court
of Appeals adhered to Buchanan in a manner inconsistent with the Wiser case. The
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There is established precedent that a conveyance of coal
with the right to "mine" is not limited to the sinking of a shaft
but may include other methods, such as stripping, which are
found convenient by the mineral grantee." In the last 20 years
a line of cases following Buchanan v. Watson upheld the right
of mineral owners under broad form deeds to remove their min-
erals regardless of the surface damage."5 In most of these cases,
the deeds contained waiver-of-damages clauses that nullified
efforts to recoup some of the landowners' losses. Reading
Buchanan and the cases following it in light of the Wiser Oil
Co. decision, the Kentucky rule seems to be that mineral own-
ership carries with it the right to destroy the surface to get the
mineral, whether or not there is a waiver-of-damage provision;
if there is no such waiver, the surface holder is entitled to
compensation only for damages beyond those contemplated
when the deed was signed. In the Wiser Oil Co. case some
damage would have resulted had the 1917-era methods of drill-
ing been used, and this would be non-compensable. The min-
eral owner is liable only for that additional damage which re-
sults from the newer methods.69
B. Right to Remove Overburden
Another right of mineral owners is that of removing as
much overlying rock as necessary to reach the minerals. In
effect this is just a variation of the right to drill and sink shafts
since both are methods of access through the surface estate.
When mining was accomplished by pits and shafts, the law
recognized the right to remove overlying strata almost as a
Court stated that the presence of a waiver-of-damage provision was not of decisive
importance in Buchanan. See text accompanying notes 123-25 infra.
1, Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956); Rudd v. Hayden, 97 S.W.2d
35 (Ky. 1936).
" Rudd v. Hayden, 97 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1936), may be considered the grandfather
of the Kentucky broad form deed rule. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956),
was the first case directly challenging the right of the mineral owner to strip mine
under the old mineral deeds. Following the Buchanan precedent are: Blue Diamond
Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960); Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith and Vicco
Coal Corp. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960) (consolidated for appeal); Ritchie v.
Midland Mining Co., 347 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1961); Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co.,
374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964); Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.
1968).
" Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
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corollary to the right of access. The early cases, however, indi-
cate that only "deep" mining was contemplated. For example,
in Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co. 70 the Supreme Court of Ohio
limited this right of mineral owners by requiring that they act
with "regard at the same time to the right of the surface owner
to subjacent support."7 Subjacent support of the surface is
relevant only if underground mining methods are used. Tradi-
tional mining methods involved only the removal of a layer of
rock or slate above the coal to obtain more headroom and a
stronger ceiling and a layer below the coal for drainage and a
level, secure floor. The right to remove these encompassing
strata was determined to be a natural right incident to owner-
ship of minerals, because in many, perhaps most, instances
mining would otherwise be impossible. To restrict the mineral
lessee to the strict terms of the conveyance (i.e., to removal of
the mineral only) would defeat the intent of all parties and
would be manifestly unreasonable.
1. Problems of Interpretation
The advent of strip mining raises the question whether a
conveyance or lease of minerals with only the right to "mine"
and without the elaborate enumeration of privileges contained
in the broad form deed gives the mineral owner the right to
strip mine. The cases are split; Kentucky has adopted the
view73 that the right to mine includes strip mining unless the
term is otherwise limited. Cases in other jurisdictions reach a
contrary result. In Stewart v. Chernicky,7' a Pennsylvania case,
the defendants strip mined a tract of land on which a 1902
mineral deed granted them all the coal in and under the tract
together with the right to remove it without liability for dam-
age to the surface. The owners of the land sued for resulting
damage. Although the facts were similar to those in Buchanan
v. Watson,75 particularly since an express waiver-of-damages
clause was involved,76 Stewart v. Chernicky reached conclu-
" 80 N.E. 6 (Ohio 1907).
" Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 7-8.
13 Rudd v. Hayden, 97 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1936).
7 266 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1970).
'5 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
' 266 A.2d at 263.
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sions of law different from Buchanan on every point consid-
ered. The opinion in Stewart by Judge Eagan resembles a
point-by-point refutation of Buchanan. He began by reiterat-
ing that in the construction of deeds the intent of the parties
at the time the deed is executed governs and that the literal
words of the deed are important only to show that intent.7 This
principle is well established in Kentucky for construction of
most deeds, 78 but it appears that an exception has been judi-
cially created for mineral deeds, whose construction has been
divorced from the parties' intent.
7 9
In Stewart the Pennsylvania court noted that strip mining
was not completely unknown when the deed was executed in
1902. But the evidence, though conflicting, was that strip min-
ing had not been introduced into that part of the state until
about 1938. The deed conveyed title to all coal under the tract,
followed by a broad grant of rights and easements:
[tiogether with the right of ingress, egress, and regress over
and through said lands for the purpose of mining, storing,
manufacturing and removing said coal and such other coal as
may be now owned or hereafter acquired by the said second
parties (grantees), their heirs, successors or assigns; also the
right to drain and ventilate said mines by shafts or otherwise
and to deposit the wastes from said mines, and to build roads,
bridges and structures with the necessary curtilege [sic] for
said purposes; with a full release of and without liability to
the surface, waters or otherwise arising from any of said oper-
ations.
7Id.
11 Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Blankenship, 300 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1957); Monroe
v. Rucker, 220 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1949); Baker v. Baker, 230 S.W. 293 (Ky. 1921). In
Baker the Court of Appeals stated that the intent of the parties, particularly that of
the grantor, is to be sought and carried out whenever possible. In recent years the Court
of Appeals has hardened its attitude somewhat. In McMahan v. Hunslinger, 375
S.W.2d 820, 822 (Ky. 1964) it declared that courts must "seek the intention of the
grantor from the language used, considered in light of such factors as the general
scheme of the subdivision. We may not substitute what the grantor may have intended
to say for the plain import of what he said." More recently the court has held the "four
comers" test applicable to deeds. Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1972). But in
view of the Handy v. Standard Oil Co., 468 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1971), holding that where
the language of a deed was ambiguous or uncertain the court should consider the
relative situation of the parties, their objects, and subsequent acts, the law is uncer-
tain.
'. Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. 1968).
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Together with all and singular the said property, rights,
privileges, hereditaments, appurtenances whatsoever ther-
eunto belonging or in any wise appertaining, and the rever-
sion and the remainders thereof, and all the estate, right,
title, and interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever
of the said party of the first part in law, equity or otherwise
howsoever of, in and to the said coal and coal space, mining
rights, and release of damages."
In holding that this sweeping grant to the mineral buyer
did not include the unconditional right to use strip methods or
a valid waiver of damages resulting from sudh methods, the
court relied on two factors. First, the court, taking judicial
notice of the devastating effect of strip mining," utilized a well
recognized rule for construing ambiguous clauses in deeds.
When confronted with a choice of construing an ambiguous
clause as fair and reasonable or inequitable and unusual, the
courts normally choose that interpretation which the parties
most likely intended at the time of the transaction.12 The court
had no difficulty in applying this rule to the case to place the
burden upon the mineral owners to prove that the plaintiff's
predecessor in title had conveyed the right to forever destroy
the land in the process of mining. Some "positive indication"
that the parties to the deed meant to authorize practices which
might result in such consequences did not materialize. Second,
with the exception of free access, egress and regress, the rights
listed in the deed were held to be relevant only to underground
mining. The most telling example was the right "to drain and
ventilate said mines by shafts or otherwise" which would ob-
viously be vital for conventional operations but irrelevant to a
strip mine operator. While the first point revealed the probable
intention of the grantor, this factor indicated that the grantee
266 A.2d 259, 263 (Pa. 1970).
" Id. The deleterious effects of strip mining upon the surface and adjoining lands
has been convincingly documented. Among recent studies conducted in Kentucky is
one funded through the University of Kentucky. The study was an open report pre-
pared in collaboration with the U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service
and Bureau of Mines; the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service and Soil Conserva-
tion Service; The Dept. of the Army, Corps of Engineers; and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, Dept. of Conservation and Dept. of Fish and Wildlife; and the University
of Kentucky. C. Collier, REPORT ON THE INFLUENCES OF STRIP MINING ON THE HYDROLOGIC
ENVIRONMENT OF PARTS OF BEAVER CREEK BASIN, KENTUCKY (1962).
82 266 A.2d at 263.
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also was thinking only of underground mining.8 3
The Pennsylvania court84 distinguished an earlier case that
was more in line with the Kentucky cases. That case held that
a grant of "all the coal" included the right to strip mine where
the parties stipulated that conventional methods were not fea-
sible. Such special circumstances which perhaps made an in-
tent to authorize stripping the more rational and usual con-
struction were not present in Stewart. Such contingencies, if
they existed, would have been mentioned in the deed. Indeed,
if conventional mining were impracticable, the elaborate grant
of easements and rights associated with underground mining
would probably not have been included.
Since the right to mine was limited to underground meth-
ods, it naturally followed that the waiver of damages clause was
likewise limited. Its broad language that "full release of and
without liability for injury to the surface, waters or otherwise"
could not be construed to include waiver of damage for unau-
thorized mining.85
By contrast, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Buchanan
v. Watson"8 rested its decision on the proposition that "since
the appellant had a right to remove all of the coal in, on, and
under the surface of this tract, the particular methods contem-
plated by the parties (in the absence of language prohibiting
other methods) does not preclude him from utilizing the only
feasible process of extracting the coal."87 In other words, the
method by which mineral is removed is incidental to the right
to remove it.
2. Extent of the Right
The extent of the mineral owner's right to remove overbur-
den to recover his property is illustrated by Wright v. Bethle-
hem Minerals Co.88 There an 1891 deed conveyed all the coal,
oil, gas, and all other minerals with the usual easements and
rights, including the right to mine by "any manner and by any
Id. at 264.
Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 102 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1954).
266 A.2d at 264.
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
Id. at 42.
368 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1963).
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method deemed either convenient or advisable. '8 9 In view of
Buchanan and its progeri the grantee's right to strip mine was
not in-issue, but the deed contained an express provision to
protect the surface in one respect. It provided that:
[a]nything to the contrary herein notwithstanding, it is not
intended by this deed to grant the right to erect any miners'
dwellings or tipples on any of said three tracts Qf land; nor is
it intended to grant by this deed the right to use any portion
of the surface of said three tracts of land for the purpose of
dumping slate thereon."0
Despite this exception in the deed, the grantee's successor
undertook stripping operations. His equipment was used to
excavate a bench in the side of the hill for the purpose of
securing a place for the rotary augers, and in the process soil,
rocks, and timber were pushed down the mountain, covering
much of the land to the depth of several feet. Naturally, the
aggrieved owner contended that this was using the surface "for
the purpose of dumping slate thereon." He also argued that the
excavation of the wide auger bench on the hillside could not be
deemed a roadway or tramway, the construction of which had
been authorized by the deed. In fact, the auger bench was used
as a roadway; trucks were loaded on the bench directly from
the augers. However, the essential use of the bench was for
placing the augers. It was undisputed that the bench was not
justifiable as a tramway or haulroad and involved far more
destruction than was contemplated when haulroads were au-
thorized.'
Without reaching or deciding the substantive effect of the
exception in the deed, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, af-
firmed an order permanently enjoining the surface owner from
interfering with the mining. The Court stated that conveyances
must be construed as a whole consistent with the purpose for
which the instrument was executed.2 Since there was no dis-
pute that the right to remove overburden is incidental to the
right to recover the coal, there was no violation of the deed.
"According to the context, the word 'incidental' may mean a
11 Id. at 180.
90 Id.
11 Id. at 181.
92 Id.
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casual chance happening, not of prime importance, or may
mean what is subordinate to the main event or act. 9 3 Appar-
ently the Court thought the reservation was meant to restrict
only the conventional piling of slate from underground mines
and resolved the ambiguity against the grantor, though with-
out mentioning that constructional rule.
If the Wright case, because of the ambiguous nature of the
deed there const rued, left doubts concerning the mineral
owner's right to remove overburden, these should have been
erased by the 1960 decision in Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
Neace.1i The deed involved therein conveyed to the mineral
grantee the right "to enter upon said lands, use and operate the
same and surface thereof. . . in any and every manner that
may be deemed necessary or convenient for mining . . . .
Several years before stripping operations were commenced, the
coal company had recovered all the minable coal under the
land by conventional methods; however, a thin fringe of coal
along the outside of the hill was left which could not be mined
due to the prohibitive cost in supporting the roof. The company
undertook to auger this remnant which required a cut into the
hillside to form the platform or bench for machinery. A great
amount of timber was destroyed; the rock, dirt and debris
thrown down the steep hillside below the cut covered some
twenty-five acres of land not being used in any way for mining
purposes. At trial, the surface owner produced several expert
witnesses who refuted the company's claim that underground
mining methods could not be used to recover the remaining
mineral."
The Court of Appeals, adhering to its decision in
Buchanan, held that since the company had a right to strip and
auger and had utilized methods customary in the industry at
the time, the exercise of that right could not of itself be classi-
fied as arbitrary, wanton, or malicious.17 Earlier cases had al-
" Id.
" 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960).
, Id. at 726.
" Id. at 726-27.
'7 Id. at 727. In Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky.
1974), the Court grafted nuisance principles onto the law of minerals to impose liability
on a coal company for "unreasonableness in the manner of use of a method of mineral
recovery." Id. at 662 (emphasis original). Commissioner Cullen, speaking for the
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ready established that the mineral owner was not restricted to
the minimum amount of land which in the opinion of a jury
would be absolutely necessary for mining." Thus the manner
in which the operation is conducted, rather than the mere pres-
ence of the operation, is determinative of the question of wan-
ton conduct.99
In the Blue Diamond decision the Court of Appeals was
faithful to its view expressed in Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. John-
son.'0" In that case the coal company had a right under its deed
to mine "all the coal" under the surface owner's house without
providing for support. This right was exercised despite the
surface owner's protests. The trial court gave an instruction
that the landowner could recover only if the company acted
wantonly, arbitrarily, or maliciously. Nonetheless, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the surface owner for $2,000 dam-
ages. In reversing, the Court of Appeals stated that the manner
in which the coal was removed from beneath the plaintiffs
home without leaving subjacent support had not been mali-
cious. The evidence was that "only light charges of dynamite
Court, analyzed the liability of a mineral owner for damage to the surface by distin-
guishing between "arbitrary, wanton, and malicious" conduct and conduct that is
"oppressive." The former refers to the attitude of the actor, whereas the latter bears
on attitude plus the effect of the conduct. Since in this case there was a claim for
damages based on an oppressive manner of mineral recovery, the Court invoked a
balancing of interests analysis from the law of nuisance to determine whether or not
the conduct in question was unreasonable. In utilizing the law of nuisance to analyze
this broad form deed case, the Court overruled two cases, Tolliver v. Pittsburgh-
Consolidation Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1956) and Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Mann, 181 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1944), which had absolved a mineral owner of liability for
creating a nuisance.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stephenson disagreed with the idea that the law
of nuisance should resolve the dispute before the Court. Instead, under the law of
mineral rights Justice Stephenson would "impose strict liability for damages to the
surface owners' improvements, improved property, and merchantable timber occa-
sioned by the conduct of a mining operation." 514 S.W.2d at 667 (Stephenson, J.,
concurring).
11 Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956); Wells v. North East Coal Co.,
72 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1934).
11 Bevander Coal Co. v. Matney, 320 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1959); Elkhorn Coal Corp.
v. Johnson, 263 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1953). In Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Campbell, 371
S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1963), the company had cut a haul road in the hillside for no apparent
purpose. The Court stated that a jury could decide the question of whether or not the
company's action was so contrary to established industry practices that the action
would be considered oppressive, wanton, and malicious.
' 263 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1953).
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were used" and that the entries were heavily timbered.10'
What then does constitute wanton, arbitrary and mali-
cious exercise of mining rights? In Croley v. Round Mountain
Coal Co. ," the Court again upheld the right to strip mine under
a "Mayo form" deed which granted the right "to use and oper-
ate the same and surface thereof ... in any manner that may
be deemed necessary or convenient for mining ... .",0" The
Court, protecting .mineral interests with a broad treatment of
the grant of "all coal", a term found in virtually all coal leases,
declared:
[tihe reservation in the instant case not only reserves "all"
coal, but also oil, gas, stone, water, and "any other minerals
in, on or under the land," with the right to "take, enter, mine,
cut, and remove any and all minerals in, on and under the
land." Obviously all coal could not be removed by the deep
mining process. Removal of stone would normally require
substantial destruction of the surface. We think the parties
must have intended that the minerals could be removed by
any recognized method or process.' 4
The company reached the limit, however, when it used
part of the surface for the dumping of waste from other opera-
tions on other lands, a process which constituted a wanton
act.'0M But since the surface, or most of it, was subject already
to substantial destruction from stripping for the underlying
coal, the measure of damages was reduced.
3. Timber Rights
Several well-recognized servitudes of the mineral estate
have been merged in Kentucky into a greatly broadened right
,' Id. at 125.
374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964).
" Id. at 853.
,' Id. at 854 (emphasis original).
,o Id. at 854. The damages recoverable in this type of case have been the differ-
ence between the value of the land immediately before and after the compensable
damage. See, e.g., Nisbet v. Lofton, 277 S.W. 828 (Ky. 1925). For a discussion of
damages recoverable in a broad form deed case based upon nuisance principles, see
Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974), where the Court
stated the established rule that a party can recover only those damages sustained prior
to trial for a temporary nuisance. However, in the case of a permanent nuisance, the
measure of recovery is the difference in fair market value of the litigant's property.
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of the mining interest to remove overburden. For example, the
right to use such amounts of timber as may be necessary for
proper mining has been long recognized.'' This has been held
to be included in the phrase "the usual rights and privileges of
mining" which appears in mineral deeds.0 7 Just as the right to
remove overburden gives no title to that overburden, the right
to use standing timber to the extent necessary for mining im-
plied no title to the trees, at least not until they have been cut
by the mineral owner.' 8 By the same token, the surface owner
could cut down all the standing timber and sell it except for
that amount needed for mining.'5 In effect, the miner's claim
for reasonable use of timber is much like a lien on all the timber
to secure a debt equal to only a part of the timber's value. The
mineral owner may intervene to protect the timber for his fu-
ture mining needs, as where the owner attempts to cut all the
trees to prepare the land for agricultural use. The surface owner
may have excepted from the deed and retained the permanent
use of his land for farming, but the right is servient to the
reasonable use of timber for mining."10 There is a dearth of
authority regarding how far the right to use timber extends. It
is clear, however, that the mineral owner may not insist upon
preservation of timber not presently being utilized for mining
solely for the reason that the timber may in the future be
usable for mining."'
The right to cut timber has become incidental to the re-
moval of overburden in strip mining. Only conventional under-
ground methods require large amounts of timber to support the
roof and sides of the tunnels. Moreover, today roof-bolting has
largely replaced the use of timber. The recent cases have fo-
cused upon the destruction of timber as an incidental effect of
Jasper Land Co. v. Manchester Sawmills, 96 So. 417 (Ala. 1922). The right of
the mineral owner to reasonably use standing timber is fast losing importance. At one
time enormous amounts of timber were used to support the mine tunnels; however,
now roof bolting, using steel bolts, is safer and is used almost exclusively. George K.
Martin, Roof Bolting in Kentucky, 1956 (thesis in chemical engineering, University of
Kentucky).
,0' 96 So. at 418.
,o' Shackelford Coal Co. v. Knight, 108 So. 247 (Ala. 1926).
,0' Steinman Dev. Co. v. W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922),
af'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1923).
"0 Kenmont Coal Co. v. Hall, 40 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1931).
Id. at 303.
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mining rather than the use of timber in mining techniques. In
Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith"' the deed conveyed the mineral
owner the right to use standing timber not more than twelve
inches in diameter. Many years after the deed was executed,
the mineral lessees began augering with the usual debris being
discarded down the hillside. In the process trees more than
twelve inches in diameter were destroyed. Recognizing that
such destruction was not "use" of the trees as contemplated in
the deed, the Court of Appeals, nevertheless, held that the
destruction was incidential to the right of utilizing the surface
in the mining process. As an afterthought the Court further
stated that removal of large trees in preparing shaft openings
or building roadways could hardly be said to violate the terms
of the deed."
3
The difference between removing timber to make room for
a shaft opening or roadway and the wholesale destruction of
timber in a way which cannot possibly aid mining operations
(i. e., by inundating the trees with debris) is one of kind and not
of degree. In the first case the removal of trees really is inciden-
tal to a reasonable exercise of mining rights. Destruction need
not be extensive; such shafts are small in size and generally
unobtrusive. In addition, the timber may be sold by the surface
owner to further mitigate his damage. In the second case the
surface owner's property in the timber is completely destroyed
with no compensating ecomomic gain to either party. The de-
struction is necessary only in the sense that once overburden
has been pushed down the mountain, it cannot be controlled
or contained. However, this distinction has been lost on the
Court, because in Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith it declared that
preservation of land is a matter for the legislature."'
Since, the Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace and Kodak
Coal Co. v. Smith cases were decided, the protection of surface
rights has been eroded still further. Probably the most dra-
matic case decided by the Court of Appeals is Martin v. Ken-
tucky Oak Mining Co. 5 Unlike some of the earlier cases, this
case was thoroughly briefed and argued. Amicus curiae briefs
"' 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960).
,, Id. at 701.
," Id. at 700.
"' 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
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were filed by the Sierra Club, the Kentucky Civil Liberties
Union, and by several mining companies not directly involved
in the dispute. Public resentment against strip mining had
increased in several Eastern Kentucky counties, particularly in
Knott County, to the point that armed violence was being
avoided on a day-to-day basis. Citizens in Knott County, where
much- perhaps most - of the total land is subject to broad
form mineral deeds, had banded together in an organization
called Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People. By the
time the appeal was argued, several armed clashes had already
occurred"' and more trouble was expected. Events seemed to
be moving swiftly toward an ominous culmination as the con-
servation movement in Kentucky made a concerted attack on
the broad form mineral deed in general and the Buchanan,
Blue Diamond, and Kodak decisions in particular.
As set out in the majority opinion the arguments presented
by the landowners were six-fold. Some of these had been pre-
sented and rejected before, but some were being advanced for
the first time in Kentucky. The arguments were (1) that the
parties to the mineral deeds could not reasonably have in-
tended that the surface should be "destroyed" in the removal
of the minerals because there would be no reason to retain
surface title if it could be rendered worthless at the pleasure of
the mineral holder; (2) it is unfair, unjust, and inequitable to
construe the deeds to allow destruction of the surface without
compensation to its owner; (3) the parties to the deeds did not
contemplate the development of strip and auger mining; (4)
the word "mining" in the deeds embraces only mining by un-
derground methods and this term should be interpreted in view
of mining techniques in use when the deed was executed; (5)
the right to "use" the surface does not include the right to
"destroy" it; and (6) the mineral owners should be estopped
from stripping or auger mining any area upon which they have
permitted the surface owner to make improvements without
providing notice of their dominant legal rights."7
At the outset the Court quickly disposed of the landown-
ers' conservation argument by stating that a decision that
broad form deeds do not convey the right to strip mine would
,,6 Louisville Courier-Journal, July 19, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
429 S.W.2d at 397.
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not bring a halt to this mining technique. The courts in Penn-
sylvania and West Virginia, it noted, had reached conclusions
favorable to the surface interests but strip mining was even
more widespread there than in Kentucky. Thus it declared,
"[c]onservation is not in issue. The issue is whether the own-
ers of minerals, who clearly have the right to remove the coal
by deep mining processes, must purchase from the landowner
the right to use strip or auger processes."1 8 Notwithstanding
the Court's efforts to brush it aside, conservation was very
much in issue. The Attorney General of Kentucky had inter-
vened in the suit on behalf of the landowners to assert the
interest of the Commonwealth in preserving its great natural
resources."'
Similarly, the first five contentions of the landowners were
lumped together for treatment. These arguments were based on
the proposition that the parties could not have intended to
permit destruction of the surface so that it could not be used
for residential or agricultural purposes. In rejecting this claim
the Court went further than ever in limiting the rights of
surface owners when it declared that:
[wihether or not the parties actually contemplated or
envisioned strip or auger mining is not important-the ques-
tion is whether they intended that the mineral owner's rights
to use the surface would be superior to any competing right
of the surface owner.
20
The surface owners next argued that the mineral owners
should be estopped from asserting their right to strip mine land
on which the surface owner had made improvements. The
Court stated that no duty existed on the part of one owning
mineral rights to thousands of acres of land to inform owners
of parcels of the surface that the latters' rights were subordi-
HI Id. at 397. All parties assumed that conservation was an issue in the case. The
fact that strip mining was more extensive in Pennsylvania and West Virginia is incon-
clusive to indicate that a ruling on the broad form deed is immaterial to conservation.
Under the Court's broad interpretation of the rights of mineral owners, Kentucky
experienced the greatest increase in strip mining among coal producing states. Be-
tween 1964 and 1972 strip mine coal production nationwide increased by 118,000,000
tons and went from 31% to 47% of total production. 1973 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FACTS 491.
'~' 429 S.W.2d at 397.
22 Id. at 397.
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nate by law. Indeed, if there were any basis for estoppel, it
would run against the surface owners since they had made their
improvements after the Buchanan decision, which provided
public notice that stripping under the broad form deed sub-
jected the mineral owner to no liability for surface damage
unless it was inflicted wantonly.
2'
The dissent in Martin was essentially two-pronged: (1) the
majority was erroneous in concluding that intent to make the
surface estate subservient should be determinative rather than
that a particular mining method was contemplated by the par-
ties; and (2) the result was not only inconsistent with decisions
on the same issues in other important coal producing states'
2
but also with prior Kentucky cases.
The Martin opinion was perfectly in accord with
Buchanan and its progeny, but a conflict between Buchanan
and Wiser put the Kentucky law in an anomalous position. Oil
and gas interests were being required to make compensation for
surface damage incidental to their work while coal mining in-
terests received carte blanche.
Of course the presence of an express waiver-of-damages
clause in Buchanan and the other broad form deed cases distin-
guish these cases from Wiser.' But this distinction must be
read in view of the statement in Croley v. Round Mountain
Coal Co.'24 that the existence of a waiver-of-damages clause in
the deed was not controlling in the Buchanan case since the
right to use strip and auger methods existed anyway. The ma-
121 Id. at 398.
,22 The dissenting opinion listed an array of authority contrary to the position
adopted in Buchanan and adhered to in Martin. At least six states have passed on
similar issues and none is in accord with the Kentucky decisions. The dissent listed:
Franklin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio C.P. 1954); East Ohio Gas Co. v. James
Bros. Coal Co., 85 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio C.P. 1948); Williams v. Hay, 14 A. 379 (Pa. 1888);
Livingston v. Moingona Coal Co., 49 Iowa 369 (1878); Catron v. South Butte Mining
Co., 181 F. 941 (9th Cir. 1910); Oresta v. Romano Bros., 73 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1952);
West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947); Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Duricka, 97 A.2d 825 (Pa. 1953); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Bailey
Production Corp., 163 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.W. Va. 1958); Campbell v. Campbell, 199
S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946); United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.
W. Va. 1955); Wilkes-Barre Township School District v. Corgan, 170 A.2d 97 (Pa.
1961); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 366 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1961); Benton v. U.S.
Manganese Corp., 313 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. 1958).
12 Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
124 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964).
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jority opinion in Martin made no further effort to distinguish
Wiser and Buchanan; the Court was simply determined to ad-
here to Buchanan and the cases following it "whether or not it
conflicted with Wiser."'1
'
Thus, under the present law, the oil and gas industry, one
of some importance in Eastern Kentucky, is treated much less
favorably than the longer established coal industry. The situa-
tion is anomalous, so much so that Judge Hill, in dissent, com-
pared the conflicting cases with "sin and salvation" - two
irreconcilables.
1 26
4. Water Rights
Another frequent source of friction between mineral own-
ers and land owners has been the use of limited water supplies.
Since water is necessary for both mining, farming and domestic
purposes, conflict has been unavoidable. Regardless of the
methods utilized, water which comes in contact with coal
mines becomes highly polluted. Therefore, if water is used for
mining it cannot be used for most other purposes.
Generally, cases in this area have favored the mineral
owner. For example, in Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v.
Meadows2 17 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
drainage of coal mines is essential to their productive use. In
this case the damage was incidental to the right of the mine
operator to construct an air shaft as required by the safety laws.
Water percolated from the surface through the air shaft and
dripped from the roof of the mine. Eventually the water, now
thoroughly polluted and highly acid, flowed out the entrance
of the mine and onto an adjoining tract of land. Since the owner
of the adjoining land claimed title through the common grantor
with the mineral owner and t6ok subject to the superior right
of the mineral owner to drain his mine, the damage to the
surface owner's land was injuria absque damnum. s2 1 Drainage
was never mentioned in the deed, but the court stated that it
'1 429 S.W.2d at 399.
121 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 402 (Ky. 1968) (Hill, J.
dissenting). The dissent stated that any use of land which resulted in major destruction
was "unreasonably burdensome, unjustly severe, and harsh" within even the meaning
of Buchanan and the other broad form deed cases. Id. at 403.
1- 34 S.E.2d 392 (Va. 1945).
' Id. at 396.
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is an inherent right fundamental to all other mining privileges
necessary for full enjoyment of the mineral estate.'29
Preeminent water rights of the mineral estate are not even
limited by the right of the surface to be secure from danger.
Some danger must be accepted by the landowner as part of the
burden mining places upon the surface. For example, where
water is pumped into an underground channel in the mine and
carried off, the surface owner is not entitled to enjoin the bring-
ing of water under his land. This is so even if he argues that if
the pumps cease functioning for any reason, the mine would be
flooded with resultant injury to the surface.' 0 Such possibilities
are too remote to justify injunctive relief for two reasons: (1)
this danger would be faced primarily by the mine owner and
(2) the whole surface estate is burdened by a servitude for
ditches, drains, and tunnels necessary for mining.'
3'
When water is impounded by the mining company the
danger to the surface suddenly releasing the water is often
substantial. In Stone Coal Co. v. Varney32 an abrupt release
of water carried tons of rock and mud onto a surface which was
being used as a residence and for light farming. The jury
awarded $3,000 for permanent damages to the shrubbery, gar-
den and water supply. Since this case did not involve a mineral
deed, the dispute was resolved by ordinary trespass principles.
The reasonable use of water for mining has been recog-
nized universally as a natural easement of mineral estates.' 33 It
has been held that an oil lease carries with it the right to use
water from a well located on the land; however, the uses must
be for drilling purposes and other reasons relating to removal
of the oil.' 34 This right is also incidental to secondary drilling
operations. If the holder of an oil lease is also authorized to tap
gas reservoirs and recover as much gas as necessary to complete
" Id. at 397.
,30 Genet v. Delaware and H. Canal Co., 25 N.E. 922 (N.Y. 1890).
,3, Id. at 926.
132 336 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1960).
"I Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636, 644 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 354 U.S.
938 (1957); Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 961-62 (Okla. 1964); Holt v.
Southwest Antioch Sand Unit Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d 998, 1000 (Okla. 1955); Strad-
ley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
'13 Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
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the oil drilling utilizing the gas as fuel, the driller may make
reasonable use of water available on the land for drilling the
secondary gas well.
5. Lateral and Subjacent Support
Traditionally, the law has imposed a duty approaching
strict liability upon mineral owners to provide lateral and sub-
jacent support for the surface.' 35 Such support is an inherent
right of the surface estate.'36 A significant Kentucky case which
explains how far the right to support extends is Nisbet v.
Lofton,' 37 a case which involved an 1899 mineral deed which
conveyed "the whole and every part of the coal mining privi-
leges and rights to mine the coal from, in and under, including
all the coal in and to a tract of land lying near the city of
Providence, Webster County, Kentucky. ' ' 38 Part of the coal
had already been mined under an earlier lease. Many years
later after most of the coal had been mined, the defendant, the
mineral owner, permitted the pillars supporting the plaintiff's
land to be removed, resulting in considerable general subsid-
ence of his property. The evidence established coal pillars 18 x
50 feet remained as lateral support after the original mining
operation under the lease. After these relatively large pillars
were reduced, inadequate support pillars approximately 4 x 6
feet in size remained.
The defendant argued that the phrase in the deed "includ-
ing all the coal" conveyed the right to remove all the coal
without regard for damage to the surface which might result;
that a requirement that pillars be left behind for support was
inconsistent with the right to recover all the coal. The Court
of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide whether the language
of the deed freed the defendant of the duty to support the land.
Noting that "at the time of the execution of this deed the coal
had even then been removed from the premises owned by
plaintiff, but that in its removal sufficient pillars had been left
"I North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 51 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1932); Jones Coal Co. v.
Mays, 8 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1928); West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dilback, 294 S.W. 478 (Ky.
1927).
"I Nisbet v. Lofton, 277 S.W. 828 (Ky. 1925).
137 277 S.W. 828 (Ky. 1925).
" Id. at 829.
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to support the surface,"' 39 the Court recognized a common law
right to subjacent and lateral support of the surface:
The act of his [defendant's] lessees in removing these sup-
ports was a wrongful act which the defendant sanctioned or
consented to, at least, he took no steps to prevent it, and of
which he has received the benefit, and hence his liability is
the same as though he had committed the wrongful acts
which resulted in the damage to the plaintiffs property.'
Surface estates are also entitled to lateral support, but the
courts have not imposed as strict a duty upon the mineral
owner in this regard. Generally, adjoining landowners may re-
cover for failure to provide adequate lateral support for their
property only if they can show negligence. In West Kentucky
Coal Co. v. Dilback"' the plaintiff owned a house on a tract of
land adjacent to land mined by the defendant. The plaintiff's
land was not subject to any lease or conveyance of mineral
rights, and there was no evidence that his land had been wrong-
fully mined. The adjoining land collapsed from lack of support
and fissures appeared, which in turn caused the plaintiff's well
to run dry. The Court fixed no liability upon the mineral owner
for the destruction of the well, since it could not be shown that
defendant had caused any settling of the adjoining land. Had
the well been on the land above the mine, the Court indicated
that liability would be absolute forothe duty to provide subja-
cent support is absolute as to the surface owner. On the other
hand, the duty of lateral support extends to adjacent land but
is breached only by negligent acts.4 2
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Kentucky General Assembly recently provided the
surface owner with some degree of protection against the oft-
times devastating effects of strip mining by amending the sta-
tutory provisions which regulate strip mining. Heretofore
these provisions required that maps and plats be delivered to
the Department of Mines and Minerals indicating the location
139 Id.
"' Id. at 831.
14 294 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1927).
44 Id. at 479.
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and effect of the strip mining operation on land and streams.
In addition, detailed plans for grading, backfilling and other
reclamation are required for issuance of a strip mining per-
mit.' Recognizing that these measures have proved inade-
quate to cope with the environmental problems inherent in
strip mining, KRS § 350.060 now requires that written consent
of the surface owner be obtained before strip mining operations
can be conducted. Most significantly, this requirement is even
present for land subject to a broad form deed. KRS § 350.060(7)
provides:
Each application shall also be accompanied by a statement
of consent to have strip mining conducted upon the area of
land described in the application for a permit. The statement
of consent shall be signed by each holder of a freehold interest
in such land. Each signature shall be notarized. No permit
shall be issued if the application therefor is not accompanied
by the statement of consent. This statement of consent shall
not be required for coal mined under the provisions of KRS
Chapter 351 and KRS Chapter 352.111
If this highly controversial measure is valid, Kentucky law will
comport with the view in other jurisdictions that the broad
form deed does not convey the right to use strip mining meth-
ods unless explicitly stated in the instrument. This amend-
ment was enacted as a result of strong popular pressure to end
what was widely viewed as a serious wrong. Clearly, most of the
legislators thought of the amendment as a conservation mea-
sure; however, the public regarded the measure as an anti-
stripping law which would enable surface owners to resist de-
struction of their property without compensation.
The new amendment, however, may be constitutionally
attacked on several grounds. First, it may be invalid because
it operates to impair contract obligations. Second, one can
argue that it deprives the mineral owner of a valuable property
right without due process of law. Third, because the new provi-
sion is limited to surface mining, an equal protection issue
arises. The most persuasive of these arguments is that the new
amendment impairs contract obligations. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals has held that broad form deeds convey to the min-
"' See KRS § 350.060 (Supp. 1972).
- Ky. AcTs ch 373 (1974).
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eral owner the right to strip mine without the consent of the
surface owner even though no such right was expressly
granted.'45 Now the legislature has limited the freedom of min-
eral owners to exploit the surface by exercising rights conveyed
to them by their deeds.
In the Kodak case the Court of Appeals expressly deferred
to the legislature any change regarding the rights of landowners
whose land is subject to "broad form" deeds. "The preservation
of the land is a matter for the legislature."'46 It is well estab-
lished that a statute is not unconstitutional merely because it
incidentally impairs existing contractual rights or hinders the
performance of a contract. Indeed, all business is conducted
subject to the retained power of the state to protect public
welfare.4 7 Moreover, one who buys into an enterprise already
regulated by statute purchases subject to further regulation.'
These cases and many others have established that private
contracts must give way before legitimate exercise of the police
power.
It is, therefore, clear that the contract clause is not an
independent barrier to legislation if that action is a valid exer-
cise of police power. On the other hand, if the recent amend-
ment is not a valid exercise of police power, the contract clause
is fully applicable and must be examined. The cases cited
above have all involved economic regulation and property
rights, but the regulation was of a broad, remedial scope. An
activity was prohibited or restricted in order to promote some
public good. In the present legislation, by contrast, the reme-
dial effect, if any, is obtained by tinkering with the contract
rights of the parties inter se. Many cases have held that where
police power is exercised the incidental impairment of con-
tracts does not necessarily invalidate the exercise. Is the con-
verse also true? Is it permissible to impair the obligation of
contracts if the result is furtherance of some public purpose?
"5 See, e.g., Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960).
"' Id. at 700.
"' Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Chicago and
Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City
of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914); Stone v. Mississippi 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
"I Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940). For a Kentucky
case which dealt with the issue of whether or not a statute impaired contract obliga-
tions, see, e.g. City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1 of Campbell and Kenton
Counties, 301 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1957).
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Is it important whether the same end could be reached by
direct regulation of the industry? Needless to say, there is little
case law to guide us. Such an approach to regulation has rarely
been tried. If the converse is true, the contract clause is vir-
tually written out of the Constitution, because some public
purpose can nearly always be connected with impairment of
the contract. While the Founding Fathers may not have in-
tended the contract clause to interfere with an otherwise valid
exercise of police power, they must have intended that the
clause have some meaning.
The validity of the new legislation depends in part upon
its purpose. It could perhaps be justified as a measure to pre-
serve the peace or to conserve land and water. The new legisla-
tion is ineffective as a conservation measure, since it delegates
to an individual, a party to the contract which severed the
mineral, a veto over the use of land by the other party to the
contract. This bestows upon the landowner the right to prevent
certain land uses, although the state's highest court has held
that the right of the mineral owner to use the surface is para-
mount. That right had been purchased for valuable considera-
tion. The Court of Appeals has considered and expressly re-
jected the argument that consideration was inadequate., The
new amendment puts the surface owner in a position to be paid
again for what he, or his predecessor in title, has already re-
ceived compensation. This theme was discussed in Martin
where the Court stated:
The argument that the landowners would not have under-
taken to sever the mineral title from the surface title, and
retain the latter, instead of simply deeding the whole title to
the mineral buyers, if they had not contemplated that the
surface would retain its value for agricultural and residential
uses, is not fully persuasive. We think the fact that in many
instances, as here, the landowner was being paid, for the
mineral rights alone, practically the full value of his land,
might well indicate that the landowner chose to retain the
bare title simply for what little value, if any, it might have.
If as appears well may have been the case, the landown-
ers who executed the broad form mineral deeds at the turn
of the century were paid prices which substantially or in large
"I Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
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part equaled the full value of the land (at least of the hillside
land) we see nothing unfair, unjust or inequitable in constru-
ing the deeds in favor of the grantees. Certainly the fact that
the surface of the land is worth much more today than it was
in 1905 is not a valid reason for saying ihat the landowners
should be paid again.' 0
In view of the above excerpt from Martin, the recent amend-
ment on its face appears to be an impairment of contracts, and
it can be upheld only if the legislation serves the public interest
and is a valid exercise of police power.
When a concerted effort was made in the Martin case in
1968 to overturn the Kentucky broad form deed rule, the dele-
terious effects of the Kentucky decisions on land and water
conservation were strongly urged as a basis to reverse the
rule."5 ' However, a majority of the justices were not persuaded:
The court is fully aware of the great public concern with the
conservation problems attendant upon strip and auger min-
ing, and the urgent necessity to protect the soil and the water
courses from destruction and pollution. However, counsel for
the landowners, and for those amicus curiae who side with
them in arguing that the broad form deed does not permit
strip or auger mining, frankly concede that a decision of this
court upholding their contention as to the constructiohi of the
deed will not stop strip or auger mining. They admit that in
Pennsylvania and West Virginia, where the courts have held
that the broad form deed does authorize strip or auger min-
ing, that type of mining is even more prevalent than in east-
ern Kentucky. And of course it is common knowledge that
strip mining has been done on a large scale in western Ken-
tucky where the broad form deed was not commonly used.'512
130 Id. at 398 (emphasis original). In Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183
(6th Cir. 1974), the Sixth Circuit discussed the Kentucky broad form deed cases.
The plaintiff in Watson filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and alleged that
the pervasive regulation of strip mining or the broad form deed cases constituted state
action. In affirming a dismissal of the suit, the court held that there was neither a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution nor state action
present in a suit where the surface owner complained of destruction of his surface
rights.
"I, For a discussion of the relative merits of each side in the energy v. conservation
dispute, see Diamond, Energy and Environment as Allies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1974,
§ 3, at 14, col. 3. For a recent case discussing the due process aspects of a statute which
provided an outright ban of future strip mining in a state forest, see Bureau of Mines
of Maryland v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 321 A.2d 748 (Md. 1974).
,12 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. 1968).
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Since the statute only does what the Court of Appeals
refused to do in the Martin case and since the Court has al-
ready said such an act does not contribute to conservation, one
is virtually forced to conclude that the statute is not a valid
exercise of the police power but instead is an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligation of contracts. The police power is
always subject to an important limitation. It may be used so
as to invade private rights only if the legislation bears a real
and substantial relation to public health, safety, morality, or
some other phase of the general welfare.' It is apparent that
the recent "broad form deed bill" cannot pass muster. Count-
less private individuals who own interests in surface estates
from which the mineral has been severed are now delegated the
right to undo whatever conservation purpose the legislation
may have by granting their consent, for a consideration, to
surface mining on their land. It is plain that the primary pur-
pose and effect of the statute is to change the relative legal
rights and economic bargaining positions of many private par-
ties under their contracts rather than to achieve any general
public purpose.
The police power is public power. It is not served by legis-
lation which vests private rights in particular persons. A law
delegating to one person a veto over land use by another is not
part of that public power described by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Noble State Bank v. Haskell.'54
It may lie said in a general way that the police power extends
to all the great public needs. . . . It may be put forth in aid
of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and predominate opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare.'55
If we were writing on a clean slate the method employed
by the recent amendment might be unobjectionable, for the
state certainly has the power to prohibit certain types of min-
ing if necessary for the public good. However, there are long
standing property rights involved. The Court of Appeals
'" Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928). See also City of Coving-
ton v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1 of Campbell and Kenton Counties, 301 S.W.2d 885 (Ky.
1957).
219 U.S. 104 (1911).
' Id. at 111.
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held-rightly or wrongly- that broad form deeds convey the
right to use strip and auger mining methods whether or not the
owner of the surface approves. A statute which obviates this
right impairs the obligation of the contract between surface
and mineral owners. As such, it is unconstitutional unless en-
acted pursuant to a proper exercise of the police power. Under
the circumstances, a grave constitutional question certainly
exists. The courts of this Commonwealth will probably be
called upon in the near future to face this question.
James K. Caudill
